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“YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN”: THE NEED FOR 
EVIDENTIARY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS IN IMMIGRATION 
COURT 
Marisa Moore Apel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under United States immigration law, immigrants subject to removal 
proceedings may apply for asylum if they face severe threats of violence 
or harm in their home countries.1 When applicants are successful, they are 
considered legal refugees and are protected from deportation.2 
Additionally, these immigrants are authorized to work in the U.S., 
provided a more direct path to citizenship, and granted rights to petition 
for family members abroad to join them.3 Obtaining asylum, however, is 
often difficult for immigrants.  
Every year in the U.S., increasingly more individuals facing 
deportation seek asylum.4 In April 2020, United States immigration court 
dockets reached an all-time high, reporting over 1.17 million open 
removal cases.5 These cases had been pending for an average of 734 days 
and were not yet resolved.6 The significant backlog in immigration 
courts—in addition to the high-stakes nature of asylum cases—places 
immeasurable strain on applicants and their families. Unlike the criminal 
justice system where the government appoints a lawyer for indigent 
defendants, asylum and removal proceedings require immigrants to either 
retain private counsel or proceed pro se.7 In 2016, the American 
Immigration Council reported that just under two-thirds of immigrants 
involved in removal proceedings chose the latter.8 
Immigrants choosing to appear alone before an Immigration Judge 
 
 1. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, I’m Afraid to Go Back: A Guide to Asylum, 
Withholding of Removal, and the Convention Against Torture, IMMIGRANT JUSTICE (May 2013), 
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/FIRRP%20Asylum_WOR_CAT-Guide-
2013_modified.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Asylum in the United States, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jun. 2020), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
research/access-counsel-immigration-court. Approximately 37 percent of all U.S. immigrants secured 
legal representation in their removal cases. Whereas two-thirds of non-detained immigrants acquired legal 
counsel, only 14 percent of detained immigrants were able to do so. Id. 
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(“IJ”) often fail to achieve their desired legal outcome.9 The length and 
complexity of U.S. immigration proceedings, language barriers, and 
remote locations of many immigrant detention facilities make it difficult 
for asylum-seekers to effectively present their case to a judge, even if they 
have access to persuasive evidence that supports their claims.10 One 
common challenge arises when an IJ identifies a need for corroborating 
evidence during asylum proceedings. Although the Third and Ninth 
Circuits have held that an immigrant must be given notice of the need for 
corroborating evidence and an opportunity to provide it before a judge 
renders a final decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
joined by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, 
does not require notice.11 The minority circuits argue that an immigrant’s 
due process rights are undermined when notice of the need for 
corroboration is not provided. The majority circuits and BIA, however, 
argue that preserving efficiency in an already backlogged court system is 
more important.  
This Casenote considers the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Wambura v. Barr,12 which expands upon the majority circuits’ position 
that notice of the need for corroborating evidence is not required.13 Part 
II of this Article contextualizes the process for defensive asylum within 
the U.S. and reviews the legislative history and case law upon which the 
majority and minority circuit positions are built. Part II also summarizes 
Wambura. Finally, Part III weighs the merits of both circuit positions 
through the lens of Wambura and concludes that the minority approach 
adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits is preferable but should be 
construed narrowly. 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.; Cristobal Ramón & Lucas Reyes, Language Access in the Immigration System: A Primer, 
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (Sep. 18, 2020), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/language-access-in-
the-immigration-system-a-primer/. 
 11. See Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015); Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 376 
(4th Cir. 2020); Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011); Saravia v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 
729, 731 (3d Cir. 2018); Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009); Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 
757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020).  
  The B.I.A. is an important part of the Department of Justice and “is the highest administrative 
body for interpreting and applying United States immigration laws.” Board of Immigration Appeals, THE 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-
of-immigration-appeals. The B.I.A. is primarily tasked with reviewing certain decisions of IJs and district 
directors of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Id. Its decisions are binding on all IJs and 
DHS officials, unless a decision is overruled by a federal court or attorney general. Id. The vast majority 
of B.I.A. decisions are reviewable by federal circuits and the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. 
 12. 980 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 13. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This Part will first provide an overview of the various processes for 
asylum and other legal defenses available to immigrants subject to 
removal proceedings. Next, it will consider the legislative history of 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(ii), which is the present statutory authority 
regarding whether notice of the need for corroboration must be provided 
to an immigrant before an IJ renders a final decision on asylum. Finally, 
this Part will discuss how U.S. circuit courts reached competing 
understandings of 8 U.S.C.A 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) with respect to the need 
for corroboration. 
A. The U.S. Process for Asylum 
There are two main processes for immigrants within the U.S. to obtain 
asylum.14 First, an immigrant may affirmatively apply through the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, a division of the Department of 
Homeland Security, within one year of her most recent arrival to the 
United States.15 Second, when an immigrant is subject to ongoing 
removal proceedings, she must defensively apply by filing an application 
for asylum with an IJ at the Executive Office for Immigration Review in 
the Department of Justice.16  
In order to qualify for affirmative or defensive asylum, an applicant 
must first demonstrate that she meets the legal definition of a refugee 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).17 The INA provides 
that one is considered a “refugee” when there is a serious threat of harm 
preventing her from returning home that stems from her race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.18   
An applicant must then prove that her fear of persecution in her home 
country is “well- founded.”19 In Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court of the United States 
clarified this standard by explaining that an immigrant must demonstrate 
there is at least a ten percent chance that she will be harmed if she returns 
home.20 Two other forms of protection in addition to defensive asylum 
 
 14. Asylum in the United States, supra note 3. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Victoria Neilson et al., Asylum Manual, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY (2007), 
https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/asylum-law-basics-2/asylum-law-basics-
elements-of-asylum-law/.  
 18. Id. 
 19. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). 
 20. Id. at 421. 
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may be sought from an IJ: withholding of removal or protection under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).21 These processes, 
however, place even stricter requirements on the applicant. In order to 
prevail on a claim for withholding of removal, one must show that the 
threat of substantial harm is more likely than not or more than fifty percent 
likely.22 A successful invocation of CAT is reserved for the most serious 
cases. To prevail on a CAT claim, an immigrant must show that it is more 
likely than not she will be tortured or killed if returned to her home 
country.23 Therefore, the threshold requirement of harm is much greater 
under CAT compared to asylum or withholding of removal.24 
Although many attributes of these defenses to removal are the same, 
they each harbor unique requirements and provide the applicant with 
different benefits. For example, if one has a criminal history or a previous 
deportation order, she may be disqualified from applying for asylum, 
which is the most favorable form of protection for immigrants. 
Nevertheless, she could still qualify for withholding of removal or 
protection under CAT.25 Furthermore, unlike asylum or withholding of 
removal, one does not have to demonstrate that the likelihood of harm is 
related to one’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social 
group in order to prevail under CAT.26 Instead, one only needs to 
demonstrate the perpetrator is a government official.27 Generally, 
applicants apply pursuant to all statutes under which they might qualify 
to have the best chance of avoiding deportation or refoulement.28 
B. Corroboration Under the REAL ID Act of 2005 
Adverse credibility and corroboration standards relating to pleas for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT are set forth 
in 8 U.S.C.A. 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), which falls under the REAL ID Act of 
2005 (the “REAL ID Act”). Prior to its passage, there was no explicit 
statutory authority regarding how an asylum applicant’s credibility should 
be weighed or whether an IJ could require corroborating evidence of 
credible testimony.29 The Ninth Circuit had previously held that an 
applicant’s testimony must be deemed credible unless an adjudicator 
 
 21. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, supra note 1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.; Asylum in the United States, supra note 3. 
 26. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, supra note 1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Wambura v. Barr, where an immigrant applied for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and protection under CAT to maximize his chances against deportation. 980 F.3d 365, 376 (4th Cir. 2020).  
 29. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 519 n.2 (B.I.A. 2015). 
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identified explicit reasons for an adverse credibility finding.30 Other 
circuits, however, held that an adverse credibility finding could be based 
on factors such as an applicant’s demeanor, inconsistencies between or 
among witnesses and evidence, or a testimony’s lack of specificity.31  
The REAL ID Act narrowly settled this debate by codifying that an 
applicant could meet her burden of proof through testimony alone, but 
only if an IJ determines that the testimony “is credible, is persuasive, and 
refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a 
refugee.”32 Moreover, an IJ may require corroborating evidence for 
otherwise credible testimony, unless the evidence is not readily obtainable 
by the applicant.33 However, circuit courts now disagree on whether the 
REAL ID Act requires an IJ to notify an applicant of the need for 
corroboration and afford her an opportunity to provide it before rendering 
a final decision.34 In relevant part, the REAL ID Act states: 
In determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the 
trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of 
record. Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide 
evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence 
must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and 
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.35 
According to Congress, the purpose of the Real ID Act was to “respond 
to terrorist abuse of [U.S.] asylum laws by amending the INA to limit 
fraud.”36 As a consequence, the Act made it harder for those seeking 
asylum to satisfy burden of proof requirements. Congress also noted, 
however, that many immigrants may be incapable of corroborating their 
otherwise credible testimonies through no fault of their own.37 To address 
this concern, Congress specified that a lack of corroborating evidence 
should not disqualify an applicant for asylum when the evidence itself is 
not reasonably available to the applicant.38  
In the Real ID Act’s corroboration provision, Congress further noted 
that the standard was based on the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-M-J-, 
where the BIA held:  
An applicant [for asylum] should provide supporting evidence, both of 
 
 30. See Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 31. Michael J. Garcia et al., IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE REAL 
ID ACT OF 2005, U.S. CONG. RES. SERV. (May 25, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32754.pdf.   
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 35. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 36. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 161 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 290-91. 
 37. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 at 165. 
 38. Id. 
5
Moore Apel: "You Should Have Known:" The Need for Evidentiary Notice Requirem
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,
2021] “YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN” 693 
general country conditions and of the specific facts sought to be relied on 
by the applicant, where such evidence is available. If such evidence is 
unavailable, the applicant must explain its unavailability and the 
Immigration Judge must ensure that the applicant’s explanation is included 
in the record.39 
Because Matter of S-M-J- does not explicitly mention that an IJ must 
provide advance notice of the need for corroboration, many circuit courts 
concluded that Congress did not intend to place this requirement on an 
IJ.40 Additionally, in 2015, the BIA adopted this understanding of the 
REAL ID Act’s corroboration provision in Matter of L-A-C-.41 Recently, 
the Fourth Circuit heavily relied upon Matter of L-A-C- when deciding in 
line with the majority circuits.42 Other circuits accord less weight to the 
BIA’s decision and instead reason that the REAL ID Act’s statutory 
construction and practical implications suggest that Congress intended for 
IJs to provide applicants with notice of the need for corroboration.43  
1. The Minority Interpretation 
In Ren v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held that the REAL ID Act 
unambiguously requires that an IJ not only provide immigrants with 
notice of the need for corroboration but also the opportunity to provide 
evidence of corroboration.44 Ren was a Chinese immigrant who entered 
the U.S. on a temporary, non-immigrant visa after he was allegedly 
tortured by the Chinese government for practicing Christianity.45 Once in 
the U.S., he applied for asylum, and an asylum officer subsequently 
initiated removal proceedings against him.46 After Ren testified to the 
court, the IJ continued the case so that Ren could obtain the following 
corroborating evidence: a bail receipt to prove his arrest in China, 
testimony from his pastor regarding the authenticity of his faith, and a 
certificate documenting his baptism in the U.S.47 At the next hearing, Ren 
failed to provide any of the requested evidence.48 The IJ therefore denied 
 
 39. Id. at 166; In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 40. See Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376; Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. 
Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v. 
Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 41. 26 I&N Dec. at 527. 
 42. See Wambura, 980 F.3d at 374. 
 43. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011); Saravia v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 
729, 737 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 44. 648 F.3d at 1091-92. 
 45. Id. at 1081-82. 
 46. Id. at 1083. 
 47. Id. at 1090. 
 48. Id. 
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his plea for asylum, and Ren appealed.49 
The Ninth Circuit held that “a plain reading of the statute’s text makes 
clear that an [IJ] must provide an applicant with notice and an opportunity 
to either produce the evidence or explain why it is unavailable” before 
rendering a final decision.50 To support this interpretation, the court 
emphasized the statute’s use of future-oriented and imperative language. 
For example, the statute says “should provide” instead of “should have 
provided” and “must be provided” instead of “must have been 
provided.”51 According to the Ninth Circuit, this language does not 
suggest retroaction.52 Rather, it evinces Congress’s clear intent to give 
applicants for asylum notice and a future opportunity to provide 
corroborating evidence.53 As a practical concern, the Ninth Circuit further 
wrote that “it would make no sense to ask whether the applicant can obtain 
the [corroborating evidence] unless he is to be given the chance to do 
so.”54 In other words, the REAL ID Act’s directive for immigrants who 
fail to corroborate their testimony to explain themselves would lack 
substance if they were not first given notice and an opportunity to provide 
the evidence. 
Based on this interpretation of the REAL ID Act’s corroboration 
provision, the Ninth Circuit held that Ren was afforded proper notice and 
opportunity.55 The IJ requested specific pieces of evidence from him.56 In 
order to give Ren enough time to collect the evidence, the IJ continued 
the case for approximately five months.57 Because these steps were taken, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the IJ’s ruling that Ren failed to meet his 
burden of proof and denied his petition for asylum.58 
The Third Circuit has since re-emphasized the due process concerns 
brought out by Ren’s interpretation of the REAL ID Act.59 In Saravia v. 
Attorney General of the United States,60 the court wrote that the 
opportunity “to supply evidence or explain why it is not available can only 
occur before the IJ rules on the applicant’s petition,” and “to decide 
otherwise is illogical temporally and would allow for ‘gotcha’ 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1091. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1093. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Saravia v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729, 738 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 60. Id. 
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conclusions in IJ opinions.”61 Furthermore, the Third Circuit argued that 
meaningful judicial review can only occur when an IJ gives notice of the 
need for corroboration and an opportunity to provide it.62  
Although the Third and Ninth Circuits interpret the REAL ID Act as 
providing asylum applicants with added protection in Immigration Court, 
the majority circuits and BIA disagree. The Fourth Circuit recently 
confronted the issue. 
2. The Majority Interpretation 
Ten years after the passage of the REAL ID Act, in Matter of L-A-C-, 
the BIA concluded that the REAL ID Act did not require an IJ to provide 
an immigrant with notice of the need for corroborating evidence and an 
opportunity to provide such evidence before rendering a final decision.63 
Matter of L-A-C- involved a Guatemalan immigrant who entered the U.S. 
in 2004 without following proper immigration procedures.64 Four years 
later, he was deported.65 In 2008, he again entered the U.S. without 
authorization, leading to his second deportation in 2012.66 Less than a 
year later, he returned to the U.S., and the Department of Homeland 
Security brought removal proceedings against him for a third time.67 
Because his prior deportations disqualified him from asylum, he applied 
for withholding of removal and protection under CAT.68 He alleged that 
his political opinions and membership with the Democratic Christian 
Union political party made him vulnerable to governmental persecution.69 
Specifically, he testified that two different mayors of his hometown 
threatened and persecuted him between 2004 and 2012 because of his 
political activities as a teacher and financial support for his father’s 
political endeavors.70  
Despite having obtained counsel, the applicant did not provide 
corroborating evidence that he was an active member of the Democratic 
Christian Union, worked as a teacher in Guatemala, or sent money to his 
father.71 When asked why, he claimed that the evidence was either 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 737-38. 
 63. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 527. 
 64. Id. at 517. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 524. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 525. 
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unavailable or he did not realize such evidence would help his claim.72 He 
maintained that he had evidence of some details, such as sending money 
to his father, but did not explain why he failed to provide it to the court.73 
Following the hearing, the IJ denied the applicant’s application for 
withholding of removal and protection under CAT.74 
Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Ren,75 the applicant appealed, 
arguing that the IJ should have automatically continued the hearing so 
that he could obtain the necessary corroborating evidence before the final 
judgment was issued.76 The BIA rejected this position based on its 
interpretation of its earlier opinion, Matter of S-M-J-.77 According to the 
L-A-C- court, S-M-J- did not explicitly state that an IJ must notify an 
applicant of the need for corroboration before rendering a decision.78 
Instead, S-M-J- held that the burden was on the applicant to corroborate 
any evidence that could reasonably be expected, even if her claim was 
otherwise credible.79  
Furthermore, the BIA reasoned in L-A-C- that Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the REAL ID Act was to “allow Immigration Judges to follow 
commonsense standards in assessing asylum claims without undue 
restrictions.”80 The Board reasoned that surely Congress could not have 
intended to create even more procedural requirements for courts to 
follow.81 Although the BIA conceded that it was “good practice” for an IJ 
to give notice, especially in cases involving pro se applicants, the BIA 
was unwilling to extend application of the REAL ID Act’s corroboration 
provision any further.82 Therefore, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision not to 
continue proceedings and to deport the applicant based on his failure to 
produce corroborating evidence.83 
C. Wambura v. Barr 
In Wambura v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit held that advance notice of the 
need for corroborating evidence is not required before an IJ renders a final 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Yaogang Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 76. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 517; See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1079. 
 77. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 519; In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 724. 
 78. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 519. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 520.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 521 n. 3 
 83. Id. at 527. 
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decision on asylum,84 siding with the BIA and Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. Wambura was an immigrant from 
Tanzania who became a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. in 2005. 
Less than a decade later, he pled guilty to “conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud, aggravated identity theft and conspiracy to commit wire and mail 
fraud.”85 The Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal 
proceedings against him pursuant to the Immigration Naturalization Act 
(“INA”).86 The INA provided that lawful permanent residents may be 
removed when convicted of such crimes.87 To avoid deportation, 
Wambura applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under CAT.88  
Wambura testified that he would likely be tortured if he re-entered 
Tanzania because he was a known and active member of Chadema, an 
opposition political party in the country.89 While in the U.S., he alleged 
that he served as a leader in Chadema USA and organized protests which 
criticized the results of various Tanzanian elections.90 Additionally, he 
alleged that he wrote letters to the United Nations and maintained a blog 
about human rights issues in the country.91 He acknowledged that his 
participation ended five years ago when he went to prison for the crimes 
permitting his deportation.92 However, he asserted that his father had 
recently told him that secret police officers were following him in 
Tanzania.93 Therefore, Wambura maintained that his prior activities made 
him a likely target for Tanzanian authorities.94  
At a preliminary hearing, the IJ asked Wambura if he could corroborate 
his testimony.95 Wambura said he was unable to provide corroborating 
evidence because he was unable to access his email account while in 
detention.96 The IJ denied all of his claims for being “totally and 
 
 84. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 85. Id. at 367. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. Due to the nature of his convictions and their corresponding sentences, an IJ later 
determined that Wambura was disqualified from seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and 
withholding of removal under CAT. Therefore, the only relief he could pursue was a deferral of removal 
under CAT. Deferral of removal is “a more temporary form of relief” than withholding of removal under 
CAT because this “status can be terminated more quickly and easily than withholding of removal if the 
individual is no longer likely to be tortured […] in their home country.” Neilson et al., supra note 18.  
 89. Wambura, 980 F.3d  at 367-68. 
 90. Id. at 367. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 368. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 376. 
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completely based on speculation.”97 Specifically, the IJ noted that 
Wambura failed to provide a letter or any other evidence of being tracked 
by the secret police.98 Additionally, the IJ noted that no Chadema 
members in the U.S. offered statements that the immigrant was actively a 
part of the group.99 Wambura appealed the IJ’s decision. However, the 
BIA agreed with the IJ and dismissed his claims, finding him ineligible 
for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under CAT.100 He then 
petitioned for judicial review of the BIA’s decision and argued that the IJ 
should have given him notice of the need for corroborating evidence prior 
to rendering the final decision on his claims.101  
The Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the IJ was under no such 
obligation.102 Instead, it argued that the REAL ID Act was silent on the 
issue of whether notice of the need for corroboration must be given.103 
The court then applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., where the Supreme Court instructed courts to:  
Initially examine the statute’s plain language; if Congress has spoken 
clearly on the precise question at issue, the statutory language controls. If, 
however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, [courts should] defer to the 
agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable.104 
Because the BIA, an important subset of the Department of Justice, 
previously interpreted the REAL ID Act’s corroboration provision in 
Matter of L-A-C-, the Fourth Circuit concluded that this interpretation 
controlled so long as it was reasonable.105  
In determining that the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable, the court 
first examined the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of L-A-C-, where it held that 
Congress’s intent behind the REAL ID Act was to codify the standards 
set forth by the BIA in Matter of S-M-J-.106 According to the Fourth 
Circuit, Matter of S-M-J- did not require an IJ to provide advance notice 
of the need for corroborating evidence or grant an automatic continuance 
for the immigrant to obtain the necessary evidence. Rather, it interpreted 
the opinion to merely direct that IJs give immigrants an opportunity to 
explain why the relevant evidence was not initially obtained and include 
 
 97. Id. at 368. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 374. 
 103. Id. at 372. 
 104. Id. at 372 (quoting Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2009)); Chevron. v. NRDC, 
467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 105. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 372. 
 106. Id.; In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997). 
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this explanation in the record.107 Ultimately, it was within the IJ’s 
discretion to extend the immigrant an opportunity to corroborate his 
testimony or not.108  
Agreeing with the BIA and the majority of other circuits, the Fourth 
Circuit found allowing IJs such discretion to be reasonable because 
immigrants “already had notice about the potential need for corroborating 
evidence.”109 This notice came in the form of the instructions on the Form 
1-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal, which directs 
immigrants to “provide evidence of general conditions in the country 
from which the applicant is seeking asylum or other protection and 
specific facts to support the claim.”110 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit 
argued that The REAL ID Act itself, with the inclusion of a corroboration 
provision, provided immigrants with notice of the potential need for 
corroborating evidence.111 Although the Fourth Circuit conceded that it 
remained good practice for IJs to notify immigrants of the need for 
corroboration before denying their pleas for asylum, the court ultimately 
dismissed the notion that the IJ was under a strict obligation to do so.112 
In rejecting the Third and Ninth Circuits’ conclusions that IJs are 
required to provide notice of the need and opportunity to provide 
corroborating evidence before rendering a decision, the Fourth Circuit 
drew from prior circuit-majority opinions on the issue.113 The court 
borrowed language from the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Gaye v. Lynch and 
asserted that “[e]ven if it could be said that the statute is silent on the 
issue, and thus possibly could allow for such a construction… it is plainly 
erroneous to say that the statute unambiguously mandates such notice.”114 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 
Liu v. Holder, where the Second Circuit argued that “an IJ may not 
determine that corroboration is necessary until all the evidence is in, and 
the IJ has had an opportunity to weigh the evidence and prepare an 
opinion…”115 Relying on these arguments, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the BIA’s interpretation of the corroboration provision was reasonable 
and should be upheld.116  
Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed that the IJ did not err by failing 
to provide Wambura with advance notice of the need for corroboration, 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 372-73. 
 113. Id. at 373. 
 114. Id. (quoting Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519, 530 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 115. Id. (quoting Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 116. Id. at 374. 
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the Fourth Circuit found that the IJ failed to make the requisite finding on 
whether the evidence was reasonably available to him.117 Consequently, 
the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent 
with its opinion, ultimately delaying Wambura’s removal from the U.S.118 
Judge Harris wrote a concurrence in which she agreed with the 
majority’s conclusion that “the IJ was required to—but did not—
determine whether [Wambura] had given ‘otherwise credible testimony,’ 
and, if so, whether he could ‘reasonably obtain’ the corroborating 
evidence…” She argued, however, that the majority should have stopped 
there.119 Judge Harris explained that the circuit split at issue in the 
majority opinion was never implicated because the immigrant failed to 
specifically request a continuance to obtain the missing evidence 
identified by the judge.120 Instead, the immigrant merely explained that 
he could not obtain the evidence when the IJ pressed him on its absence.121 
In so doing, he did not imply that the evidence was forthcoming.122 Based 
on these facts, Judge Harris asserted that the IJ’s decision whether to issue 
a continuance was “beside the point.”123 All the IJ needed to do was 
evaluate the immigrant’s explanation for why the evidence was 
missing.124 Therefore, she would have avoided “deepening the circuit 
split” in the majority’s opinion by side-stepping the issue.125 
III. DISCUSSION 
Federal circuit courts agree that it is good practice for IJs to give 
immigrants notice of the need for corroboration and an opportunity to 
provide corroborating evidence before rendering a final decision on 
asylum.126 The remaining question, however, is whether they should be 
required to do so. This Part argues that even if the congressional intent 
behind the language of the REAL ID Act’s corroboration provision is 
ambiguous, the provision is meaningless unless immigrants are first given 
proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to present the corroboration 
requested by the IJ. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit’s 
recent interpretation of this provision in Wambura is not practical or 
reasonable given the present dynamics of U.S. immigration courts.  
 
 117. Id. at 375. 
 118. Id. at 375-76. 
 119. Id. at 376. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Id. at 372.; Ren, 648 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011). 
13
Moore Apel: "You Should Have Known:" The Need for Evidentiary Notice Requirem
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,
2021] “YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN” 701 
Section A of this Part considers the challenging circumstances that pro 
se applicants for asylum encounter, which make the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding in Wambura particularly unreasonable. Section B weighs 
immigrants’ need for added procedural safeguards during the asylum 
process against the court’s interests in expediently resolving cases and 
explains how courts may account for both of these interests. Finally, 
Section C argues that, although the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
REAL ID Act has merit, other circuits and ultimately the Supreme Court 
of the United States, should endorse the narrower arguments made by the 
Third Circuit in Saravia. That approach provides the best 
counterargument to the Fourth Circuit’s assertion that an immigrant is not 
entitled to notice of the need for corroboration or an opportunity to 
provide corroborating evidence before her plea for asylum is rejected. 
A. Difficulties Experienced by Pro Se Applicants During the Process for 
Asylum 
Whether immigrants obtain or forego assistance of counsel strongly 
influences the outcomes of cases in removal proceedings.127 Immigrants 
with counsel are more likely to prevail on their claims in the end and 
pursue defenses such as asylum in the first place.128 In 2016, the National 
Immigration Counsel reported that detained immigrants who retained 
counsel were eleven times more likely to apply for asylum than their pro 
se counterparts.129 Moreover, non-detained immigrants with counsel were 
five times more likely to apply for asylum.130 These statistics may suggest 
that a significant number of pro se immigrants with meritorious asylum 
claims fail to raise such claims. This is likely because some immigrants 
do not understand how to raise the asylum defense or are unaware of the 
defense altogether.  
Unfortunately, the odds are stacked against pro se immigrants even 
when they do raise a claim for asylum.131 Few immigrants are native 
English speakers and, as a result, language barriers often add a layer of 
complexity for them when representing their interests.132 Although having 
an interpreter present throughout the case helps alleviate this issue, it does 
not entirely diminish the risk of miscommunication or oversight.133 For 
 
 127. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 8. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Ramón & Reyes, supra note 10; National Immigrant Justice Center, Access to Counsel, 
https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/access-counsel, (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).    
 133. Id. 
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example, consider an interpreter who assists an immigrant with the Form 
1-589 application for asylum, which must be completed in English.134 The 
interpreter is neither responsible nor likely to know which parts of the 
Form 1-589 are most important for the immigrant to understand. 
Therefore, even though this form briefly mentions that applicants may 
need to provide corroborating evidence before winning their case, it is 
entirely possible that the interpreter could rush through or neglect this 
language when explaining the form to the immigrant.  
In addition to arguing that the Form 1-589 provides immigrants subject 
to removal proceedings with sufficient notice of the need for 
corroboration, the Fourth Circuit in Wambura also argued that the REAL 
ID Act provides immigrants with this advance notice.135 However, few 
individuals—aside from legal professionals and politicians—know that 
the REAL ID Act exists, and even fewer know what information the Act 
contains. Especially with regard to immigrants who demonstrate a limited 
proficiency in English, it is unreasonable to expect them to seek out this 
Act, know which provision is relevant to their case, and then translate it. 
As a result, the Form 1-589, REAL ID Act, and other government texts 
likely fail to deliver actual notice of important requirements, such as the 
need for corroboration, in a number of asylum cases.  
Approximately fifty-six percent of immigrants subject to removal 
proceedings also struggle to defend their interests because they were 
detained by the government in prisons, jails, and detention centers for 
their entire case.136 Obtaining counsel from behind bars is extremely 
difficult for many individuals because they cannot freely travel to meet 
with an attorney and, even when they can find an attorney, must often rely 
on telephone calls in lieu of in-person meetings.137 Furthermore, unlike 
the U.S. criminal justice system, which requires defendants to be tried in 
the location of the offense, immigrants are often transported to detention 
facilities hundreds of miles away from their homes and families where 
they are forced to undergo court proceedings in new locations alone.138 
Because hiring an immigration attorney is costly, the distance between a 
detained immigrant and her family further complicates her ability to 
obtain counsel because detainees are generally inhibited from earning 
wages.139 Detained immigrants also struggle to collect evidence to 
 
 134. I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/i-589, (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).   
 135. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 136. Another 10% of immigrants spent some time behind bars during their case but were released 
prior to their final hearing. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 8. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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corroborate their claims because of their inability to participate in the 
outside world.140 Wambura provides a helpful example: Wambura alleged 
that his detention precluded him from accessing his email account to 
obtain the requested corroborating evidence.141  It is possible that 
Wambura’s inability to access this evidence substantially harmed his 
chances against deportation.   
Adopting the Third and Ninth Circuit’s application of the REAL ID 
Act’s corroboration provision does not alone solve the challenges 
immigrants must overcome to achieve asylum. However, it is a small, yet 
important step towards ensuring that immigrants are given a meaningful 
opportunity to defend their case against well-prepared government 
lawyers. In addition to the problems created by language barriers and 
immigrants’ likelihood of being detained, few immigrants comprehend 
how the asylum process works and what is expected of them.142 Although 
IJs may view it as an obvious expectation that immigrants should be 
prepared to corroborate their testimony, this expectation is not always 
clear to immigrants unfamiliar with the U.S. immigration system. Most 
immigrants do not have legal training and therefore cannot anticipate 
when they will need corroborating evidence to back up their testimonies. 
Moreover, when IJs fail to specify the additional evidence needed, 
immigrants may innocently believe that the evidence is not important to 
their case.143 Not only can such misunderstandings be disastrous to an 
immigrant’s plea for asylum, but they undermine an immigration court’s 
ability to fairly adjudicate claims. A notice requirement will ultimately 
lead to more immigrants providing relevant and persuasive evidence to 
support their pleas for asylum, allowing IJs to make more informed 
decisions regarding whether an immigrant should be granted asylum.  
Immigrants with counsel should also be afforded notice of the need for 
corroboration and an opportunity to provide the evidence before an IJ 
rules on their pleas for asylum. A recent survey of judges conducted by 
Richard Posner and Albert Yoon reported that immigration law was the 
practice area in which the quality of legal services was the lowest.144 
Another survey of IJs in New York reported that approximately 50% of 
the lawyers appearing before them provided their clients with “either 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Wambura, 980 F.3d at 376. 
 142. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 8. 
 143. For example, the immigrant in Saravia v. Attorney General of the United States alleged that a 
primary reason the corroboration identified by the judge was not introduced was because he was not told 
to do so and therefore did not realize the evidence needed to be introduced. 905 F.3d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 
2018). 
 144. Benjamin Edwards & Brian L. Frye, It’s Hard out there for an immigrant; lemon lawyers make 
it harder, THE HILL (Jan. 19, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/369702-its-hard-out-there-
for-an-immigrant-lemon-lawyers-make-it-harder.  
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inadequate or grossly inadequate representation, and the worst lawyers 
actually make their clients worse off.”145 Substantiating these findings, a 
2015 study on asylum cases reported that the bottom 10% of immigration 
lawyers “actually reduced the chance of relief so much that the applicant 
would have been better off without a lawyer.”146   
Immigrants who hire attorneys rarely have the legal knowledge to 
evaluate whether an attorney’s services are benefitting their case. Steps 
such as requiring IJs to provide immigrants with notice of the need for 
corroboration ultimately bridge this gap by allowing immigrants to 
become more involved in their cases. Therefore, with notice of the need 
for corroboration, immigrants may be less dependent on their attorneys 
and able to rectify their attorneys’ mistakes by producing their own 
corroborating evidence. 
Requiring IJs to provide such notice and opportunity will help address 
inequities within the U.S. immigration system. Notice and opportunity 
requirements would afford immigrants, especially pro se immigrants, an 
added procedural safeguard to ensure a fair opportunity to present their 
best cases for asylum. In the U.S. criminal justice system, all defendants 
have the right to a government-appointed attorney because of the severity 
of the charges and corresponding sentences brought against them. 
Although the right to appointed counsel is not recognized within the U.S. 
immigration system, it is important to note that the consequences faced 
by asylum-seekers can be just as, if not more, severe than the 
consequences faced by defendants in criminal proceedings. Many 
immigrants who apply for asylum sincerely believe they will be harmed 
by returning to their home countries. Moreover, being indefinitely 
separated from one’s home and family is an emotionally painful situation 
for anyone to endure. Given these factors, IJs should take reasonable 
steps, such as providing notice of the need for corroboration, to ensure 
that immigrants are not unduly disadvantaged in the courtroom. 
B. Weighing the Interests of Immigrants and the Courts 
Although it is clear that immigrants applying for asylum would benefit 
from additional procedural safeguards, the BIA in Matter of L-A-C- 
argued that IJs should be able to follow commonsense standards without 
undue restrictions.147 Ultimately, the majority circuits are weary about 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.; See Banks Miller et al., Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in 
Cases of Asymmetrical Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 209 (2015), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/lasr.12123?casa_token=gzfdjQuj2aEAAAAA:oKc-
uE4WN5RWVhCiEsNeAbkZGu5im6hqHlUhnFy7K67hYGX1Acec-utb_kqcYUrb7utJIfE8xQdycWkP.  
 147. 26 I&N Dec. 516, 520 (B.I.A. 2015). 
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overburdening IJs with additional procedural requirements, which could 
delay asylum cases on already crowded dockets.148 In fact, some IJs are 
so overwhelmed by their caseload that they reported “seven minutes on 
average to decide a case, if they decided each case schedule for a hearing 
before them that day.”149 Although expediency is a legitimate concern 
given the hundreds of thousands of cases pending in U.S. immigration 
courts, the legitimacy of the system is severely undermined when rushed 
processes lead to unjust results. Not only are IJs more likely to make 
significant errors when they are forced to quickly deliver complex legal 
decisions, but they risk failing to fully develop the record in the process.150 
This causes more complications in the appeals that inevitably follow.151  
Furthermore, the objective to expediently resolve asylum cases gained 
traction under the Trump Administration, under which the Department of 
Justice “imposed case-completion quotas” and tied IJs’ “individual 
performance reviews to the number of cases they complete.”152 These 
schemes deter IJs from carefully reviewing asylum claims before 
rendering what could be the most consequential decision in an 
immigrant’s life. Although the Biden Administration pledged to roll back 
many of Trump’s policies targeting asylum-seekers, such policies take 
significant time to replace and run the risk of being reinstated by later 
administrations.153 Therefore, unless the political landscape shifts, 
immigration courts arguably prioritize expediency to the detriment of the 
court system’s integrity.  
Requiring IJs to pause in their analysis of a case to provide notice of 
the need for corroboration and an opportunity to provide corroborating 
evidence should be a priority because it will naturally lead to the 
introduction of more evidence in removal proceedings, allowing IJs to 
make more informed decisions regarding asylum. The present dynamics 
of the U.S. immigration courts already pressure IJs to rush through every 
stage of an asylum case to reach a verdict. Although collecting evidence 
is time-consuming, notice requirements would allow immigrants to 
understand what evidence an IJ needs and plan accordingly. Moreover, it 
 
 148. See Id. 
 149. Empty Benches: Underfunding of Immigration Courts Undermines Justice, AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jun 17, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org 
/research/empty-benches-underfunding-immigration-courts-undermines-justice. 
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would reduce the risk of “gotcha” moments, which were identified by the 
Third Circuit in Saravia, when an IJ hands down a final judgment denying 
asylum.154 Due process mandates that immigrants who have access to 
evidence determinative to their case be able to provide such evidence. 
However, if immigrants are not put on notice of the need to produce it, 
they may not understand that the evidence is even desired by the court. 
Therefore, a notice requirement will ultimately benefit both immigrants 
and the courts because it would encourage informed decision-making in 
light of the hardships faced by immigrants during the asylum process. 
Requiring IJs to provide notice of the need for corroboration would 
begin to balance the scales between immigrants and the government. 
Therefore, this step is not only good practice but necessary to ensure that 
immigrants have a genuine opportunity to plead their case. This does not 
mean, however, that the U.S. immigration system’s need for expediency 
should be forgotten altogether. In her Wambura concurrence, Judge 
Harris argued that, because Wambura never asked for a continuance, the 
IJ only needed to evaluate Wambura’s explanation for why the evidence 
was missing.155 Unlike the majority, she would not have entertained the 
idea of issuing a continuance for him to obtain the missing evidence.156 
Although Wambura implied that some requested evidence was previously 
beyond his reach, he never said that he would be unable to corroborate his 
claims if the case were continued.157 In fact, Wambura may not have 
known that a continuance allowing him to collect the evidence was even 
an option. For these reasons, Judge Harris’s approach is somewhat 
unforgiving to immigrants who do not understand the innerworkings of 
immigration courts.  
However, Judge Harris’s concurrence raises a compelling point. If an 
immigrant testifies that the corroborating evidence requested by the IJ 
was unavailable prior to the hearing and would not, under any 
circumstances, become available in the future, then it makes no sense for 
an IJ to continue the case for the sole purpose of allowing the immigrant 
to obtain the evidence. Instead, the IJ should merely consider the 
immigrant’s explanation for why the evidence is unavailable and include 
it in the record before issuing a final decision. This approach echoes the 
instruction of Matter of S-M-J-: when corroborating evidence is 
unavailable, “the applicant must explain its unavailability and the [IJ] 
must ensure that the applicant’s explanation is included in the record.”158 
IJs could then more efficiently manage their dockets by only continuing 
 
 154. Saravia, 905 F.3d 729, 738 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 155. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 376 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 374. 
 158. In Re S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1997).  
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the cases that would truly benefit from it. Although affording immigrants 
more time to collect evidence often outweighs concerns regarding 
expedience, there are times when the opposite is true. When an immigrant 
testifies that the evidence in question will never become available, the IJ 
should be permitted to issue a decision without delay, so long as the 
immigrant’s explanation for why the evidence is unobtainable is carefully 
considered.  
C. The Statutory Text of the REAL ID Act and the Practical Effects of 
the Majority Interpretation 
The Third and Ninth Circuits both argue that IJs should be required to 
give notice of the need for corroboration and an opportunity to provide 
corroborating evidence before rendering a final decision on asylum. 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s justification for this policy is much broader. 
In Ren, the court first explained that a plain reading of the REAL ID Act’s 
statutory text mandates this notice.159 Next, the court explained that the 
REAL ID Act’s requirement that IJs detail in the record why the 
immigrant is missing corroborating evidence lacks substance if 
immigrants are not first affirmatively given an opportunity to provide 
such evidence.160 Though the Third Circuit agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit’s second argument, it declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s view 
that the REAL ID Act unambiguously required IJs to provide immigrants 
with this notice and opportunity.161 
The Ninth Circuit’s textual interpretation of the REAL ID Act’s 
corroboration provision is not unreasonable. Notably, it pointed out that 
Congress chose to use future-directed and imperative language when 
instructing immigrants to provide the evidence in question.162 For 
example, the REAL ID Act states that immigrants “should provide” 
corroborating evidence when requested by an IJ and that evidence “must 
be provided” unless it is unobtainable.163 This implies a much different 
meaning than if the statute had instead been written to retroactively clarify 
that immigrants “should have” provided corroborating evidence when 
requested by an IJ, and such evidence “must have been provided” unless 
it was unobtainable. If Congress wanted to avoid requiring IJs to provide 
notice, this past-tense language would more clearly establish its intent. By 
using future-oriented language, however, Congress arguably suggested a 
future opportunity for immigrants to present evidence to the IJ. 
 
 159. Yaogang Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 160. Id. at 1092. 
 161. Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738. 
 162. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1091. 
 163. Id. 
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Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress unambiguously 
expressed its intent that immigrants be given a future opportunity to 
produce corroborating evidence.164  
But the mere existence of the circuit split regarding the REAL ID Act’s 
corroboration provision indicates its ambiguity. The Fourth Circuit, 
joined by five other circuits and the BIA, argued that Congress’s intent 
cannot be ascertained from the language itself.165 Moreover, the Third 
Circuit declined to take up the issue when it rejected the majority circuit 
approach.166 To further evince the statute’s ambiguity, consider a reader 
who interprets the statute to mean that immigrants should provide 
corroboration during the same hearing the evidence was requested by the 
IJ. Although this interpretation does not make sense in terms of 
facilitating judicial review, the statutory text, taken at face value, does not 
unambiguously contradict such an understanding. Therefore, other 
circuits as well as the Supreme Court should instead adopt the Third 
Circuit’s narrower arguments focused on judicial review concerns 
regarding when notice of the need for corroboration is not given. Many 
of these arguments are also endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Ren.167 
In Saravia, the Third Circuit argued that applying the BIA’s 
interpretation that the REAL ID Act did not require IJs to provide notice 
and opportunity would severely undermine appellate review of their 
decisions.168 According to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), appellate courts may 
not reverse “a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the 
availability of corroborating evidence… unless the court finds [. . .] that 
a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating 
evidence is unavailable.”169 However, in order to determine whether the 
IJ’s conclusion was reasonable, the record must be sufficiently developed. 
This not only requires an IJ to consider whether the evidence in question 
was introduced to the court but whether the immigrant could have 
obtained the evidence. 
The BIA and majority circuit approach ultimately fails to recognize the 
significance and application of the second question. If an IJ only 
introduces into the record that an immigrant failed to provide the 
corroborating evidence and does not ask her if the evidence was available 
to her, an appellate court cannot meet the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 
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1252(b)(4). In Wambura, the Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed that lower 
immigration courts were subject to this duty.170 Even though the court 
held that IJs were under no obligation to provide advance notice and an 
opportunity to produce corroborating evidence before rendering its final 
decision, it remanded the case because, on appeal, the IJ and BIA failed 
to inquire as to whether the evidence was even available in the first 
place.171 However, it would not have made sense to ask Wambura whether 
or why the evidence was unavailable to him if he was not even notified 
that he needed to provide it. This begs the question of how the 
immigration court system would benefit from appellate courts learning 
that corroborating evidence was available even though IJs were 
purportedly under no obligation to continue the case for immigrants to 
obtain it. 
To highlight this point, consider the immigrant in Saravia, who was 
asked by the IJ why his mother had not yet testified in his favor.172 He 
responded that he never knew that his mother needed to testify and was 
constrained by time and resources to further corroborate his testimony.173 
However, his mother was waiting outside of the courtroom when this 
exchange occurred.174 This explanation, combined with the 
circumstances, clarifies that the evidence sought by the IJ could be 
introduced so long as the immigrant was given a future opportunity to do 
so. Given the high stakes in asylum cases, it would have been unjust for 
the Third Circuit to hold that the lower court was not required to give the 
immigrant an opportunity to provide corroborating evidence now that he 
was aware of its influence on the outcome of his case.  
Ultimately, IJs must provide notice and an opportunity for immigrants 
to produce corroborating evidence to ensure that immigrants with 
legitimate asylum claims are not deported and put in harm’s way. U.S. 
circuit courts and the Supreme Court should therefore adopt the Third 
Circuit’s argument that the majority circuit approach impedes judicial 
review in an already overburdened system where errors are bound to 
occur. Based on this argument, the majority’s interpretation of the REAL 
ID Act’s corroboration provision is unreasonable, and future courts need 
not rely on the questionable idea that the REAL ID Act was 
unambiguously written to produce such an unjust result.  
 
 170. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 375 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 171. Id. at 375-76. 
 172. Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738. 
 173. Id. at 738-39. 
 174. Id.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Today, immigrants subject to deportation proceedings face numerous 
obstacles when raising the asylum defense. Most notably, many 
immigrants are unable to obtain competent legal representation because 
of their financial insecurities or detainments in remote locations. 
Furthermore, the various complexities embedded in the asylum process, 
in addition to language barriers, often exacerbate immigrants’ troubling 
circumstances. Requiring that IJs provide immigrants notice of the need 
for corroboration and an opportunity to provide corroborating evidence 
affords immigrants an additional procedural safeguard that ultimately 
begins to reduce the present inequities in the U.S. immigration system. 
Additionally, notice and opportunity requirements facilitate the 
introduction of persuasive evidence, allowing IJs to make more informed 
decisions less likely to be disturbed on appeal. Therefore, the U.S. 
Supreme Court and other circuit courts should adopt the Third Circuit’s 
argument that requiring IJs to provide notice and opportunity not only 
promotes fairness but is imperative for meaningful judicial review. 
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